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WAIVING GOODBYE TO THE UCC:
A PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT THE
CONTINUING EROSION OF RIGHTS
UNDER AN IMPERFECT CODE
Daniel A. Gecker* and Kevin R. Huennekens**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code) seeks to facili-
tate commercial transactions by promoting certainty, consistency, and
uniformity across disparate jurisdictions.' Certainty of result should
translate into lower-cost commercial transactions because it should re-
duce the cost of litigating over or insuring against ambiguities.
The concept of freedom of contract is an equally important goal
of the UCC.2 The Code generally allows parties to waive or vary its
terms to achieve a customized contract.3 Freedom of contract, how-
ever, is not absolute. For example, parties may not waive the bedrock
of commercial dealings-the obligation of good faith.4
Permitting parties to vary the UCC's terms by agreement allows
for the flexibility necessary to structure complicated commercial
transactions. This flexibility allows the parties to shift burdens to re-
* Principle, Maloney, Yeatts & Barr, a Professional Corporation; B.A., 1978,
Princeton University; J.D., 1982, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. I am indebted to Steven S. Biss, Michael A. Condyles, and Laura Lee Garrett for
their research assistance.
** Principle, Maloney, Yeatts & Bar, a Professional Corporation; A.B., 1975, College
of William and Mary; J.D., 1978, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary.
1. UCC § 1-102 provides:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to. promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1990).
2. See id. § 1-102(2)(b).
3. See id. § 1-102(3).
4. Id. § 1-203.
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duce costs. The ability to waive warranties, 5 for example, should re-
duce the cost to .the sellers of goods by transferring those costs to the
purchasers. The transfer should manifest itself by way of a reduced
sales price; although it may merely result in the ability to generate
greater profits. Similarly, the ability to waive enforcement-related
provisions of the Code, such as the right to receive notice,6 should
serve to strengthen a lender's collateral position, and thereby reduce
the costs associated with repossession and a forced sale upon default.
This should result in a lower interest rate, although arguably, it may
merely result in circumvention of rights accorded by the Code by the
party in the superior bargaining position.
Other than the inability to waive good faith, diligence, reasona-
bleness, and care, there are very few sections of the UCC which can-
not be waived or varied by agreement.7 Although the area of secured
transactions protects the rights of debtors upon default, rights pro-
vided under other sections of the UCC can be and routinely are ig-
nored.. Far from meeting the goals set forth in section 1-102, the Code
encourages extensive waivers of rights, complicating the most basic
transactions. The courts are increasingly forced to determine the bona
fides of waivers, without the benefit of bright-line tests." Conse-
quently, the uniform enforcement of the Code's provisions has been
eliminated. The Code has become a checklist for forms, rather than a
statute for enforcement. 9
5. See, e.g., id. § 2-315 (addressing warranty of fitness for particular purpose).
6. See, eg., id. § 9-504(3) (providing for notice to debtor prior to sale of collateral).
7. In recognition of the inherent inequality of bargaining power found in most se-
cured transactions, the remedial provisions of Article 9 are an exception. Id. §§ 9-501(3)
to -507 (discussing rights of debtor after default).
8. Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1675, 1680, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205,
208 (1994), withdrawn, No. S040252, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 4258 (July 28, 1994); see A & M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 123 (1982).
9. A modern bank-form guaranty is illustrative. The typical guaranty routinely
waives:
(a) The right to require the bank to bring any action against the maker;
(b) The right to require that the bank resort to any security held by the bank or to any
accounts maintained at the bank by the debtor,
(c) Any and all rights available to the guarantor under state statutes;
(d) Any claims against the bank for failure to perfect a security interest in any prop-
erty securing the obligations of the maker,
(e) Any claim for discharge based upon an extension of or change of the time of
payment and/or the manner, place, or terms of payment;
(f) Any claim for discharge based upon the exchange, release, and/or surrender of all
or any collateral;
(g) Any claim for discharge based upon settlement with the maker or discharge of the
maker,
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Two factors militate against allowing complete freedom of con-
tract. First, parties seldom are of relatively equal bargaining power.
In a commercial world where parties are of equal bargaining power,
the potential for harm from allowing bargained-for Waivers is mini-
mal. But, in a commercial marketplace inhabited by large institutions,
negotiated terms are the exception and not the norm. Thus, waivers
represent a potential danger to the substantive rights of those without
sufficient bargaining power to protect themselves by consensual con-
tract. Consequently, the current business climate reflects this issue by
the attention focused on "consumer transactions."
Second, at some point, the costs occasioned by disparity outweigh
the benefits achieved by freedom of contract. It may become neces-
sary to litigate the variations to which the parties agreed.
The goals of the Code would be served better by eliminating
those provisions which are no longer useful in the marketplace and
are routinely waived,10 and having the balance of the Code mean what
it says. A stripped-down, modernized Code would allow the parties to
agree to new terms, rather than contracting around the statute, and
would eliminate the costly litigation overlay.
II. Tim ORIGIN OF THE DocrRnm OF WAIVER
Waiver as a legal concept began to appear in reported decisions
and treatises in the late 1700s. Prior to that time, when movable prop-
(h) Any defense based upon impairment of collateral;
(i) The right to challenge jurisdiction of the court in the state in which the bank is
located;
(j) The right to have service of process in accordance with the statutes of the state in
which the bank is located (regular mail substituted for the formal service requirements);
(k) Notice of acceptance;
(1) Notice of further extensions of credit to the maker,
(m) Presentment and/or demand for payment of any of the obligations of the maker,
(n) Protest or notice of dishonor or default;
(o) Any demand for payment under the guaranty;
(p) The benefit of any homestead rights or exemptions from seizure otherwise pro-
vided by applicable law;
(q) Any defenses which the maker might have against the bank;
(r) All claims against the maker, direct or indirect, arising from or relating to the
guaranty, including the right of reimbursement, exoneration, indemnification, and/or con-
tribution and all right of subrogation to the claims of the bank;
(s) The right to trial by jury; and
(t) The right to court process (arbitration or confession of judgment provision).
A similar list of formbook waivers in sales contracts would be equally illustrative.
10. For example, presentment and notice of dishonor are so routinely waived that the
default rule should be that they are automatically waived absent an agreement requiring
them.
November 1994)
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erty consisted for all practical purposes of cattle,"1 actual delivery of
goods appears to have been the only mode of transfer. The accept-
ance of earnest money and the giving of faith and pledges customarily
sealed the bargain. Written contracts were not used. 2 Influenced by
Roman and ecclesiastical law and custom in all realms, the law of con-
tract in England developed by degrees.13 In most commercial transac-
tions, credit became currency in law as well as in fact. 4 Because of
the prospects for national and international trade and the potential for
abuse in the system, the law set out to make credit uniform and to
ensure that debt truly had freely exchangeable value. About the sec-
ond quarter of the fourteenth century, Mediterranean traders estab-
lished the main features of bills of exchange, out of which grew the
whole system of modem credit in England." Bills of exchange and
promissory notes were a part of that branch of the common law
known as the "law merchant."1 6 The law merchant consisted of the
usages of merchants in the various "departments" of trade as ratified
by decisions of courts. Upon usages being proved, courts adopted
them as settled law with a view to the interests of trade and public
convenience.' 7
Against this backdrop, waiver was broadly identified as the "pass-
ing by of a Thing, or a Refusal to accept it. s18 One commentator
noted that "[s]ometimes [waiver] is applied to an Estate, or something
conveyed to a Man, and sometimes to a Plea." 9 From the beginning,
English jurists had problems moving beyond a general conceptualiza-
11. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 57 (2d ed. 1959).
12. Id.
13. At common law, the most usual types of contracts for the acquisition of personal
property were (1) sales or exchange (barter) contracts, (2) bailments, (3) hirings (leases)
and borrowings, and (4) contracts of debt. Contracts of debt included debts by record,
deeds, and debts by simple contracts, such as bills of exchange and promissory notes. 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446 (RI. Bum ed.,
9th ed. London 1783).
14. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 217-22 (6th ed. 1929).
15. 1I at 219-20.
16. 4(1) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 508 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone ed.,
4th ed. reissue 1989) [hereinafter HALSBuRY's LAWs].
17. See 12 id. 458 (citing Goodwin v. Robarts, 10 L.R.-Ex. 337, 346 (Ex. Ch. 1875);
Brandao v. Barnett, 8 Eng. Rep. 1622, 1624 (H.L. 1864)); see also 8 WILLIAM S. HoLDs-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 161-76 (1926) (discussing evolution of bills of ex-
change under common law in 17th century).
18. GILES JACOB, NEw LAw-DIcnONARY (8th ed. London, H. Woodfall & W.
Strahan, Law-Printers to the King's Most Excellent Majesty 1762) (found, in alphabetical
listing, under word "Waiver").
19. Id.
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tion of waiver and applying the doctrine in commercial cases at a
more specific level. In Stackhouse v. Barnston,20 for instance, the
court observed that "[a]s to waiver, it is difficult to say precisely, what
is meant by that term, with reference to the legal effect."' Regardless
of these nascent analytical questions, courts clearly believed by 1762
that a waiver as to goods and chattels "will be effectual."'22
The parameters of the doctrine of waiver were firmly established
at common law in the nineteenth century. Waiver was defined to be'
the renunciation or abandonment of a right or interest, whereby the
right was lost or extinguished. 3 Waiver could be express or implied.24
A person who was entitled to the benefit of a contractual stipulation,
or a statutory provision, could expressly waive it and allow the con-
tract or transaction to proceed as though the term or provision did not
exist 5 In some cases, however, courts ruled that a statutory provision
enacted for general public purposes, and not for the benefit of a par-
ticular person only, could not be waived.26 The policy behind this rule
was that a person could not renounce a right which was his or her duty
to the public and of which the claims of society forbade the
renunciation.27
At common law the renunciation or abandonment of the right
had to be supported by valuable consideration 28 or by matter of rec-
20. 32 Eng. Rep. 921 (M.R. 1805).
21. Id. at 925; see also Ross T. Smyth & Co. v. T.D. Bailey, Son & Co., 3 All E.R. 60,
70 (H.L. 1940) ("The word 'waiver' is a vague term used in many senses.").
22. JACOB, supra note 18 (citation omitted).
23. 16 HALSBURY's LAWS, supra note 16, 922.
24. 16 id.
25. 16 id. 922 & nn.9-10 ("Delay is not necessarily waiver, although it may be evi-
dence of waiver.") (citing Selwyn v. Garfit, 38 Ch. D. 273, 284 (Eng. C.A. 1888); Ex parte
Moore, In re Stokoe, 2 Ch. D. 802 (Eng. C.A. 1876) (holding that statutory requirement as
to time for disclaimer by trustee in bankruptcy may be waived)).
26. See, e.g., Habergham v. Vincent, 30 Eng. Rep. 595, 607 (Ch. 1793).
27. See id. (quoting Latin maxim "quisquis renunciare potest juri pro se introducto").
28. Williams v. Stem, 5 Q.B.D. 409, 412 (Eng. C.A. 1879) (holding promise not to
enforce accrued right is not binding unless supported by consideration or debtor has al-
tered position). Reliance was generally sufficient consideration at common law to support
a waiver. 16 HALSBURY's LAWS, supra note 16, 922. In Williams, the court addressed
whether a party to a secured interest under an indenture had waived the contractual right
to take immediate possession of the goods upon the debtor's default. See 5 Q.B.D. at 410-
12. The debtor paid 13 consecutive weekly installments under the contract. Id. On the
day the 14th payment became due, he had to appear as a juror. He called upon the credi-
tor and requested additional time in which to pay the installment. Id. The creditor told
the debtor that he would "not look to a week." I& at 411. Relying on this statement, the
debtor served on the jury for three days-but on the third day the creditor seized the
debtor's goods and sold them. The court phrased the question as whether the defendant
had "so acted as to induce the plaintiff to believe that the defendant would hold his hand."
November 1994]
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ord or deed.2 9 A right could be waived impliedly by conduct indicat-
ing an intention to abandon the right, or in some cases by neglect to
enforce the right.3" No person was deemed to have waived a right,
unless he or she was fully aware of the right and the facts of the case.3 1
In addition, no waiver would be found unless the person acted under
such circumstances that a court might reasonably presume that the
right was intended to be waived.32 Common-law courts also appar-
ently believed that waiver could be effectual upon principles analo-
gous to that of estoppeP 3 or release? 4
The principles of waiver articulated at common law were adopted
without change in the United States. 5 In cases involving bills and
notes, waiver could be express, as where it was stated in direct and
positive terms in the instrument.3 6 It also could be implied, as where
it resulted from the conduct or an understanding between creditor and
debtor and from which it could be reasonably inferred that the parties
intended a waiver.37 As a general rule, waiver could also be shown by
custom.
38
Id. The court decided that there was no evidence of waiver because no benefit had ac-
crued to the creditor from his promise. Id. at 411-12.
29. See 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 16, 573.
30. The acts relied upon had to be inconsistent with the continuance of the right al-
leged to be waived. See Keene v. Biscoe, 8 Ch. D. 201, 203 (Eng. 1878).
31. 16 HAiSBURY's LAWS, supra note 16, 922.
32. Vyvyan v. Vyvyan, 54 Eng. Rep. 813, 817 (M.R. 1861) ("Waiver or acquiescence,
like election, presupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights, and
that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another.").
33. See Williams, 5 Q.B.D. at 412; Price v, Dyer, 34 Eng. Rep. 137, 140 (Ch. 1810). In
the case of written contracts, although the terms could not be varied by parol evidence,
there was nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing verbally to waive any stipulation of
the contract as to the mode or time of performance. If the contract was performed in
accordance with such verbal agreement, courts would find that the terms, which had been
waived, were discharged. See 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 16, 572 (citing Stead v.
Dawber, 113 Eng. Rep. 22 (K.B. 1839)).
34. Stackhouse v. Barnston, 32 Eng. Rep. 921, 925-26 (1805) ("A mere waiver signifies
nothing more than an expression of intention not to insist upon the right; which in equity
will not without consideration bar the right any more than at law accord without satisfac-
tion would be a plea."),
35. See generally RENZO D. BowERs, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF WAIVER 19 (1914)
(providing excellent discussion of doctrine of waiver in United States and source for early
cases).
36. See id. at 19-21 (discussing requirements for effective waiver of terms in contract).
37. See id. at 20.
38. Id. at 80-81 (citation omitted).
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DocrRiNE OF WAIVER
Increasingly, the principle of freedom of contract predominates
the development of the doctrine. Waivers are routinely enforced in
almost all areas, criminal and civil. However, the courts have yet to
adopt a general theory that unifies the concept of waiver across all
areas of law.39 Although the most familiar definition of waiver, "an
intentional relinquishment . . .of a known right or privilege,"'  is
often cited, this definition is used infrequently in waiver analysis. In-
stead, waivers of the most fundamental rights are routinely enforced,
and conduct is often held to waive rights whether known or
unknown.4 1
Modem limitations on the ability to waive rights stem from two
sources. The restriction can be predicated on either the status of the
protected person or the importance of the right. In the first category,
minors are not entitled to waive rights. 42 In addition, guardians gener-
ally are not entitled to waive rights for their wards, nor are commit-
tees entitled to waive rights for incompetents. In the latter category,
the inability to waive the right in question is usually based upon the
primacy given to that right. This restriction on waiver is often framed
in terms of public policy. Where a statutory right involves a strong
public policy, a waiver of the right is ineffectual.43
The protection afforded consumers in commercial transactions
has been an outgrowth of both of these sources. The judicial proscrip-
tion on waiver has developed from the concept of unconscionability
39. See Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478,
479-80 (1981).
40. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
41. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977) (stating that incriminating
statement made subsequent to indictment can constitute waiver of Sixth Amendment right
to counsel); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (addressing failure to object to
grand jury selection); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (addressing failure to
file appeal); United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing failure to raise
defense of double jeopardy); United States v. Semel, 347 F.2d 228, 229 (4th Cir.) (stating
that defendant waived objection to venue by pleading guilty), cert denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965). See generally Rubin, supra note 39, at 491-528 (summarizing present law of
waivers).
42. See BOWERS, supra note 35, at 22-23.
43. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (holding written
waiver of employee's right to liquidated damages under wage laws ineffectual); EEOC v.
Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that waiver of right to fie charge
with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is void as against public policy); Boyd v.
Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 waiver void as matter of
law and against public policy); Haas v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 380 So. 2d 873, 875
(Ala. Civ. App.) (holding that waiver of protection afforded by teacher tenure laws is inef-
fectual on public policy grounds), cert denied, 380 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 1980).
November 1994]
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which has become the judicial hook upon which the fundamental
rights of consumers have been hung. Although not expressly prohibit-
ing waiver of fundamental rights when confronted with adhesion
contracts,44 courts recently have been reluctant to enforce waiver pro-
visions absent a showing that the waiver was informed.45 Because the
courts have not been able to develop a uniform doctrine of waiver or
to apply the doctrine consistently, legislatures have sought to fill the
void. Increasingly, constimers as a class have been the beneficiaries of
statutes enacted for their protection. The UCC's waiver provision has
been preempted in an increasing number of areas, restricting the free-
dom of consumers to contract by eliminating their right as a class to
waive certain substantive rights.46 Both legislative and judicial re-
sponses have resulted in the application of an increasing number of
exceptions to the Code. The exceptions have eroded the consistency
that the Code sought to achieve and have destroyed uniformity of
commercial transactions for a broad class of persons in society.
IV. Ti DoCTiNE OF WAIVER AND SPONSORS OF THE UCC
The UCC sponsors initially rejected the application of the doc-
trine of waiver carte blanche to all commercial contracts. Except in
certain instances, parties were not to be free to vary the provisions of
the Code in all matters related to their commercial dealings.47 Section
1-108 of the 1949 draft of the UCC provided that "[t]he rules enunci-
ated in this Act are mandatory and may not be waived or modified by
agreement unless the rule is qualified by the words 'unless otherwise
44. A contract of adhesion is a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by
the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the oppor-
tunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.
45. Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1675, 1681, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205,
209 (1994), withdrawn, No. S040252, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 4258 (July 28, 1994); see Obstetrics
& Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985).
46. For example, the right to assert underlying defenses against a seller's assignee can
be waived. U.C.C. § 9-206 (1990). Consumers, however, can no longer waive this right in
consumer credit contracts because of federal preemption of this area. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 433.2 (1975).
47. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-108 (1949), reprinted in 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DiF.rs 31 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly compiler, 1984). There were many sources from which
the sponsors of the UCC could have, but did not, adopt a general principle of waiver.
Section 62 of the draft of the Federal Sales Act, for instance, stated that
[w]here any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by
implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the
course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to
bind both parties to the contract or the sale.
H.R. 1619,75th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1937), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DRAmFrS, supra at 46-47.
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agreed' or their equivalent."" "Great care" was taken to specify
those provisions of the Code that could be modified or waived.49 In
all other cases, the rules set forth in the UCC were intended to be
mandatory. The rules were intended to govern the contract.50
The inflexibility initially prescribed by the Code grew out of the
concern that the courts would not be capable of knowing, without
clear direction from the drafters, which sections of the Code should be
susceptible to variation by agreement and which sections were defini-
tional and therefore mandatory."1 It was feared that the courts would
destroy the goal of predictability and uniformity in commercial
transactions.
The conflict between competing interest groups for favorable
treatment in the Code52 is not a new one. The banking lobby in 1950
had difficulty with the strong statement of nonwaivability of the
Code's provisions. Initially, the controversy focused on Article 4,
Bank Deposits and Collections, and it resulted in Article 4 being ex-
empted in its entirety from the nonwaivability mandate. The conflict-
48. U.C.C. § 1-108 (1949), reprinted in 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAmS, supra
note 47, at 31. The 1950 Draft of the UCC contained a similar provision. U.C.C. § 1-107
(Proposed Final Draft 1950), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAM, supra
note 47, at 55-56. The official comment to the 1950 Draft defined the term "agreement" as
including usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance. Id. at 56 (citing
official comment to § 1-107).
49. U.C.C. § 1-107 cmt. (Proposed Final Draft 1950), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTs, supra note 47, at 56. As the official comment to subsection (4) of
§ 1-102 illustrates, the language "'unless otherwise agreed'" was used "to avoid contro-
versy as to whether the subject matter of a particular section does or does not fall within
the exceptions to subsection (3)." U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 3 (1990).
50. U.C.C. § 1-107 cmt. (Proposed Final Draft 1950), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAS, supra note 47, at 56.
51. The official comment to § 1-108 of the 1949 draft stated:
This Act contains two types of rules: (1) Rules which are mandatory that is,
intended to govern the contract; (2) Rules which are intended to merely substi-
tute for matters not expressed by the parties to the contract.
The former may not be modified or waived by agreement. The latter may be
waived or modified at will. The failure of the courts to distinguish between these
two types of rules in interpreting prior Acts has led to complete lack of uniform-
ity. Accordingly, great care has been used in specifying those rules which may be
modified or waived by agreement. In all other cases, it is intended that the rules
shall be mandatory.
U.C.C. § 1-108 cmt. (1949), reprinted in 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAS, supra
note 47, at 31.
52. See Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with, the Whores, or Who Is
Saving the UCC?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 563 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a
Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3
and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 743 (1993).
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ing policy issues between freedom of contract versus a strong code
were hotly debated. 3
At the 1950 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, Karl
Llewellyn advocated a general rule against waiver unless it was specif-
ically authorized in the Code.14 He argued that there were two differ-
ent kinds of rules that exist throughout the law.
The first type is where the rule "controls [the transaction] regard-
less of the desire of the parties.- 5 The rule governing the negotiabil-
ity of an instrument is an example of this kind of mandatory rule.
Parties simply should not be free to create their own customized terms
rendering instruments negotiable.
Second, there are those that Llewellyn referred to as rules of con-
struction. These "attempt to set out what one may call a standardized
contract for the parties, to fill in all the points that they have neglected
to talk about."5 6 This type of rule should be subject to variation by
the parties.
Llewellyn wanted the proposed Code to clearly distinguish be-
tween the mandatory rules and the rules of construction. 7 He was
concerned that the courts often failed to distinguish adequately be-
tween the two types, leading to a "queer unpredictability in the actual
case law."1
5
The 1949 version of the Code provided a bright-line distinction
between the rules' of construction and the mandatory rules, by begin-
ning rules of construction with the preface "unless otherwise agreed,"
or words of similar import. 9 All other rules in the Code were
mandatory.
Llewellyn thought that the bright-line test included in the 1949
draft of the Code would enhance freedom of contract because each
party would have a clear understanding of where it stood. Complete,
unbridled freedom of contract was Llewellyn's equivalent of commer-
cial chaos.6 Only within the structure of an order imposed by a
53. See Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in Joint Session with National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Consideration of Proposed Final
Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 A.L.I. PROC. 1 (1950) [hereinafter ALI
Proceedings].
54. Id. at 174-77.
55. Id. at 174.
56. Id. at 175.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 176.
60. Id.
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meaningful and consistent set of rules are parties really free to engage
in commercial transactions.6'
Frederick Beutel, a frequent critic of the proposed Code,62 ar-
gued against the mandatory rules. He claimed that there was no pre-
cedent for them in commercial transactions:
All the other Code provisions that I have ever encountered,
including the NIL [Negotiable Instruments Law], are rules of
law which apply unless the parties agree otherwise. It is a
fundamentally established principle of law in all free nations,
that the rules of the civil law can be waived by contract un-
less the law specifically provides otherwise.
All our Codes in the past have been drafted that way.
All our thoughts toward law, civil law rules, operate that
way. We are operating in a commercial field in which the
law is extremely complicated, and in which the desires of the
parties can be infinite.63
The underpinnings of the policy debate were purely political. If
the position of Beutel were adopted, which was strongly supported by
the banking lobby, the chances for the Code's acceptance would be
enhanced.64 When the vote was finally taken, the section prohibiting
waiver was retained.
The clarity of the 1949 draft of the UCC was short-lived. The
matter was referred to the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) where it
once again took center stage. The PEB held numerous discussions
with representatives of banking groups, who expressed repeated con-
cern about the impact of a Code which would not allow them to vary
its terms for different customers. 65 The result of these negotiations
was reported at the 1951 meeting of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.66 While the debate addressed, in
61. Id. Llewellyn also explains:
I should have thought that to show clearly which rules are which, would make
contract easier and more certain. It seems to me that the question on freedom of
contract must come in regard to particular rules which are thought undesirable
and which are thought to be properly subject to contract when they are said in the
Code not to be subject to contract, and that the problem, therefore, should be one
of spotting those rules and thereby eliminating them by curing them.
Id. at 176-77.
62. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YALE LJ. 334 (1952).
63. ALI Proceedings, supra note 53, at 178.
64. Id. at 181 (reporting remarks of Walter Malcolm).
65. See Proceedings in Committee of the Whole on UCC, NCCUSL, in N.Y., N.Y.
(Sept. 10-15, 1951) [hereinafter NCCUSL Proceedings].
66. Id.
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lofty airs, the competing policies, the reality facing Code adoption in
the legislatures of fifty states necessitated compromise. The UCC was
just another piece of legislation; and perfection had to be sacrificed to
garner support.67
To facilitate passage and eliminate the opposition of the banking
lobby, drafters removed the section prohibiting waiver.6 8 The com-
promise reached in 1951 led to the adoption of the "imperfect" Code,
and created the situation Llewellyn tried to prevent in the initial
drafts. All reference to "mandatory" rules was eliminated. The idea
that commercial practices could and should be regulated by a stipu-
lated body of law, which could not be bargained away, was replaced
by the principle of near total "freedom of contract." Contrary to the
earlier provisions of the Code, the rules were allowed to be waived or
modified even though the provision was not qualified by the words
"unless otherwise agreed." The 1952 redraft added a new section 1-
102(3)(c), which stated that certain "general obligations" prescribed
by the UCC, "such as good faith, due diligence, commercial reasona-
bleness and reasonable care" could not be disclaimed by agreement.6 9
However, the parties were free to determine the standards by which
67. One participant spoke frankly of the situation:
There have been those who say that two groups have been working on this
Commercial Code, those who dwelt in an ivory tower and those who were in the
marketplace.
... There are two great forces which move for improvement, and one of
them is a leader, and we have had a leader here who has led well and far in this
Commercial Code. The other force is the force of necessity. If this thing which
we are seeking to do now is enacted, although imperfect, the day is going to come
when necessity will require that it be perfected. I think we must not try for com-
plete perfection now. Perfection can be postponed.
I am not claiming that these two bodies should descend into the market place
and pay no attention to our desire to produce a good Code. We must produce a
good Code. But if we seek perfection and get no Code, that is considerably worse
than having a Code which may be imperfect and which someday may be per-
fected. It seems to me that we must cut somewhere in the middle, that we must
not lose the support, and certainly must not incur real opposition of a very power-
ful group; the banks in New York and the banks elsewhere can hurt very much
our ability to get this Code on the statute books, and that is where we want it.
Id. at 18-19 (reporting remarks of Harrison TWeed).
68. See id at 19.
69. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (Official Draft 1952), reprinted in 14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRAS, supra note 47, at 43-44. The provision which allows the parties to deter-
mine standards of good faith, due diligence, reasonableness, and care has puzzled many
commentators. See, e.g., Commercial Law and Practice Guide 1.04[2] (Barry L. Zaretsky
et al. eds., 1994) ("We have never been too sure of what this language means.").
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the performance of "such obligations" were to be measured, if the
chosen standards were not "manifestly unreasonable."70
Between 1952 and 1958, changes were recommended to UCC
section 1-102(3)(c) that would make it clear that good faith, due dili-
gence, reasonableness, and care were the only general obligations that
could not be waived.71 These recommendations were adopted. Sec-
tion 1-102(3) now provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agree-
ment, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except
that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to
be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.72
V. RECENT DEVELoP1MNTS
The erosion of predictability, certainty, and uniformity of result
continues. The revisors of Article 3 recently replaced several bright-
line rules with invitations for litigation. For example, section 3-605
changed the prior rule that an accommodation party is discharged as a
result of a material modification of the underlying obligation. Now an
accommodation party is discharged to the extent that the modification
causes loss to the accommodation party. The revision also allocates
burdens of proof, thus transforming the provision from a conventional
standard into something more akin to an evidentiary rule. Because of
its recent passage, the courts have not yet become saturated with liti-
gation caused by the amendment to this section. If the best thing that
a commercial lawyer can do for his or her client is to keep the client
out of court,73 it must follow that the best thing that the drafters of the
70. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (Official Draft 1952), reprinted in 14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRAFrS, supra note 47, at 43-44.
71. U.C.C. § 1-102 (Official Draft 1952) (including changes and modifications ap-
proved by Enlarged Editorial Board at meetings held on Dec. 29,1952, Feb. 16, 1953, May
21, 1953, and Dec. 11, 1953), reprinted in 16 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAMS, supra
note 47, at 43-44.
72. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990). Course of dealing and usage of trade continue to be
important in determining whether agreed-upon "standards" by which good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, and care are measured are "manifestly unreasonable." Id. cmt. 2.
73. Letter from Donald J. Rapson, Member, Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC,
to Peter A. Alces, Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1986)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review), cited in Peter A. Alces, Roll Over,
Llewellyn?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 543, 545 (1993).
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commercial code can do is to eliminate provisions which, by their very
nature, require judicial intervention.
The impact of the 1951 compromise on the waiver position has
been the Code's failure to provide meaningful rules of the road for
practitioners. Allowing virtually complete freedom of contract means
that the "bargains" negotiated can be determined only in the courts.
A court will consider a wide variety of circumstances to provide a
commercial context for the contract's execution, including the relative
bargaining strengths of the parties, the nature and extent of the nego-
tiations, and specific representations made or withheld during those
negotiations.7'
The Code should be revised so that it means what it says and so
that what it says is enforceable regardless of the positions of the par-
ties. The Code should eliminate those provisions which are so rou-
tinely waived that inclusion of them no longer -makes sense. For
example, almost all commercial notes waive presentment. Thus, the
requirement for presentment has lost virtually all commercial mean-
ing. The term, like many, should be deleted in order to eliminate the
need of constantly having to contract around the provision.
The remainder of the Code should be made meaningful. Af-
forded rights should not be subject to elimination simply by the forms
of the party with the superior bargaining power. The value of the
right should not be dependent upon the party's status or classification.
A uniform doctrine of waiver must be developed, and it should be
applied consistently throughout the entire Code. If a right is impor-
tant enough to be included in the Code and if it is not merely a "rule
of construction," then a provision should be made in the Code to in-
sure its availability. If the complexity of a transaction dictates waiver
of a fundamental right or if the parties truly desire elimination of a
right after deliberate negotiation for enhanced consideration, then the
waiver should be knowing and intended as its definition suggests. Ac-
cepting that commercial dealings require an ability to contract freely,
the ability to waive provisions of the Code should not be completely
eliminated. However, to provide real freedom, availability of options
should be prescribed. Bright-line tests can be incorporated into the
Code to provide the standard by which meaningful waiver can be de-
termined without having to turn constantly to a judicial forum. A re-
74. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 124 (1982).
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vision of the Code to make its provisions mandatory absent a showing
of separate value for an extracted waiver can achieve this goal.
In the context of the warranties of merchantability and fitness, for
example, separate value for waiver could take the form of two price
structures: (1) for the sale of goods with warranties, and (2) for the
sale of goods without warranties. Litigation over the classification of
the purchaser as a consumer would be eliminated. Providing the op-
tion to choose between waiver and nonwaiver should become
mandatory. The warranty must be available if the purchaser chooses
not to waive it. No artificial or disguised shifting of costs or burdens
will occur. The market will determine the value of the waiver when it
does occur.
In finance contracts, enhanced remedies for the lender could be
priced through interest rates or points. A choice not to waive the pro-
visions in question would have to be provided. The differentiation in
price would clearly establish the negotiated meaningful consideration.
In the event a market is not sufficiently developed or is unable to offer
a meaningful dual-pricing structure, the provisions of the Code should
not be subject to waiver.
Parties of "equal bargaining power," where the contracts are tra-
ditionally negotiated by professionals, will have full freedom of con-
tract retained. Parties not of unequal bargaining power who
voluntarily and with full awareness enter into agreements, should ex-
pect the courts to enforce those agreements as written.75
This proposal goes beyond what the courts have fashioned in de-
termining whether a party to a contract of adhesion has effectively
waived a right. The judicial response has been to tie the effectiveness
of the waiver to whether it was conspicuous in the contract or whether
the provision was within the "reasonable expectations" of the adher-
ent. The courts have suggested that this can be shown by a separate
box to check indicating assent.76 But this remedy has proven insuffi-
cient in other contexts. It requires only a change in the forms used.
Similar to the requirement that the waiver of warranties be placed in
bold or larger typeface, it will not lead to a substantive change in
75. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174,187 (1972) (ruling that waiver of prejudgment
notice and hearing will be enforced where parties are of equal bargaining power and
waived rights with full awareness of legal consequences).
76. See Broemmer v. Abortion Serv., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992); Bell v. Congress
Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1675, 300 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (1994), withdrawn, No.
S040252, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 4258 (July 28, 1994); Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693
P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985).
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rights among parties of unequal bargaining power. It will not unify
the concept of waiver throughout the Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current commercial reality is that a large number of transactions
occur between parties of unequal bargaining power. Substantive
rights believed to be important by the drafters of the UCC are rou-
tinely waived, with or without the understanding and meaningful con-
sent of the waiving party. In order to provide protection to all parties
and to restore uniformity to the Code, the current policy of complete
freedom of contract should be changed. Specifically, section 1-102(3)
should be amended to read as follows:
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agree-
ment, except
(i) as otherwise provided in this Act;
(ii) that provisions enacted for the benefit of a party may not
be disclaimed by agreement unless the disclaimer is supported by sep-
arate and stated value and unless the option not to disclaim is clearly
provided on the same terms and conditions absent the separate and
stated value or the agreement is between parties of equal bargaining
power; and
(iii) the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness,
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement
but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such stan-
dards are not manifestly unreasonable.
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